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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to integrate the theory of trade with that of capital
movements, and to study the two country world where each nation has a different
rate of time preference.

It resolves the indeterminacy problem intrinsic in the

Heckscher-Ohlin model where trade and factor movements coexist by assuming that
capital movements are infinitesimally more costly than trade in goods.

Under

certain assumptions, one can dichotomize the behavior of asset accumulation from
the dynamic pattern of trade specialization.
Complete specialization will take place most likely in the country with a
higher rate of time preference, which specializes into the more labor-intensive
sector.

It is shown that a single-commodity model does exaggerate the amount of

capital movements, but that the qualitative nature of asset accumulation patterns
obtained in a single-commodity model of capital movements holds intact in the
model that incorporates trade.

This paper offers another explanation to the

Feldstein-Horioka paradox that domestic investment responds more closely to
increasing savings than capital outflows do.

If an economy is imperfectly

specialized, increased savings will be absorbed in capital deepening rather than
in capital outflow.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
UNDER DIFFERENT RATES OF TIME PREFERENCE
Kyoji Fukao and Koichi Hamada

I. INTRODUCTION
In his ingenious article, Stiglitz (1970) considered the consequence of different rates
of time preference and resulting saving behavior between two trading countries. He demon
strated in a two-country model of trade that at least one country must completely
specialize unless the two nations have identical long-run interest rates, i.e. identical rates
of time preference. His model, however, allowed no factor movements, perhaps following
the tradition of international trade theory. A natural extension of his model in light of the
present world where capital movements are active would be to inquire what happens if one
allows factor movements in addition to trade in the presence of different rates of time
preference.
Another line of research on capital movements under different savings behavior has
focused on the study of a single commodity model of economic growth (Bardhan 1967;
Buiter 1981; Hamada 1966; and Ruffin 1979). Under the single commodity assumption, no
factor-price equalization takes place through trade and "equilibrium would be attained by a
division of society into two classes, the thrifty enjoy bliss and the improvident at the
subsistence level" (Ramsey 1928). This type of single commodity model (except Buiter
(1981) who relies on the overlapping generation model) exaggerates the amount of capital
movements because of the absence of factor-price equalizing forces through trade. 1
Moreover, from trade-theorists' perspective, there is nothing in this type of model that
1Existence

of non-traded goods or consumption bias toward domestic goods also decreases
the amount of capital movements. See the comments by Krugman (1989) on Hamada and
Iwata (1989) that claim the third of the U.S. capital will be owned either by West
Germany or Japan in 2010. Also see Engel and Kletzer (1989).
1
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distinguishes itself from a closed economy with heterogeneous consumers (e.g., Becker
1980).

Ideally, intra-temporal terms of trade as well as intertemporal terms of trade

should be considered in a unified framework.
This paper is an attempt to integrate these two lines of research.

In order to

integrate trade theory and the theory of factor movements, we must cope with the
"indeterminacy" problem. In the absence of transportation or adjustment costs, as already
noted by many authors (Chipman, 1971; Kemp 1969; and Wong 1986), trade and factor
movements become substitutes as equalizers of the factor price as long as both economies
are imperfectly specialized. Therefore, we need some additional assumptions to prevent the
system from being indetermined.

Conforming to the tradition of international trade

theory, we resolve this indeterminacy issue by assuming that international capital flows are
slightly more costly than movements of two consumption goods, though transportation
costs could be negligible in the actual calculation of the development path. This assump
tion may seem artificial, but it is one reasonable way to choose an equilibrium path from
multiple indeterminate equilibria. It will also enable us to depict explicitly the develop
ment of trade and factor movements and to delineate the limitation of the single-good
capital-movements model as well as of trade model without factor movements. Moreover,
by doing this we are now able to develop a model of trade and investment based on a solid
microeconomic foundation. We may also note that this assumption is conceivably the least
favorable assumption for capital movements. By assuming this, we can assess the upper
bound of the degree of exaggeration of capital flows in a single-commodity model. (An
alternative approach to resolve this indeterminacy problem is suggested by Koch (1989).)2

2In a small country with static expectations, Onitsuka (1975a,b) attempts to resolve this
issue by introducing an investment function with adjustment cost. Probably the ideal way
to cope with this indeterminacy problem would be to introduce an explicit structure for the
cost of trade and that of factor movements along the line suggested, for example, by Mussa
(1974). This would be, however, another research topic. Also, we did not get into the
more general models (e.g. Brecher and Feenstra 1983; Chipman 1971; Uekawa 1972) that
allow the differences in production technology to resolve the indeterminacy.
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The main conclusions of the paper are summarized as follows: First, in the model
with capital movements as well as trade commodity the rate of returns to capital are
always equalized, and the structure of production in both countries can be easily analyzed.
By some additional assumptions, we can dichotomize the development pattern of ownership
and that of trade specialization. Similar to Stiglitz (1970) the world economy that starts
from incomplete specialization will eventually approach a long-run equilibrium where one
of them is completely specialized, but in contrast to his result without capital movements
that allows substantial possibility of complete specialization, in our setting it is unlikely
except for a coincidence that both countries are completely specialized.
Secondly, the conclusion of a single-good growth model certainly exaggerates the
magnitude of capital movements compared to present model where trade is assumed to be
always easier than the transportation of capital goods. However, the qualitative nature of
the Ramseyan conclusion that a more patient country will eventually own a major part of
world capital (Hamada and Iwata 1989) still holds true in a model that takes account of
factor equalization through trade even under our most favorable assumption against factor
movements. Also, the same structure could be superimposed on the model of evolution
with nonlinear saving functions (cf. Fukao and Hamada 1989). This analysis shows that,
even in the world economy where trade works towards equalization of factor prices, a long
term accumulation of foreign indebtedness can easily occur provided that a nation has a
less time-patient attitude in its saving behavior.
Thirdly, the change of specialization patterns depends crucially on the spending pro
pensity, i.e., the slope of the Engle curve and relative factor intensity of production.
Suppose the home country is more time patient, and the propensities to spend on two
goods are not very different. Then it is more likely that the less time-patient foreign
country will end up being perfectly specialized in the labor intensive industry. In other
words, an empire with the diversified industrial structure will coexist with a colony with
the monolithic labor-intensive industry.

4

Finally, this model sheds some light on the controversy between Feldstein and
Horioka (1970) and their critiques (e.g., Obstfeld 1986; Roubini 1989). The weak response
of capital outflow over excess savings may well be the result of the capital deepening effect
that excess savings are invested in domestic capital-intensive sector rather than exported
abroad in the economy that is incompletely specialized.
The plan of this paper is as follows: In the next section, we develop a two-country
model with trade and investment. In Section III, we discuss the short-run determination
of the specialization patterns, and in Section IV the process of capital accumulation with
changing patterns of trade specialization. We sketch some possibility for generalization of
the model in Section V and conclude with the discussion of Feldstein-Horioka controversy
in the final section.

II. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND CAPITAL FLOWS
Let us first present a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade and
capital flows on which we conduct our analysis. Consider two countries, H (home) and F
(foreign) with identical technology and identical population. Each country can produce
two goods, X and Y, by well-behaved homogeneous production functions:
xj

= Fx(K¾, L¾) = L¾ fx(k¾)

'

Yj = Fy(K½, L½) = L½ fy(k½) , j

= H, F ,

where Xj is the output of goods X in country j , Yj that of goods Y , K¾ and L¾
the capital and labor input in X sector of country j , and k¾ capital-labor ratio, and
similarly for good Y. X sector is assumed to be more capital-intensive than Y sector
without any factor-intensity reversal (k¾ > k¾) . The aggregate capital-labor ratio of
county j is denoted by kj

= Kj/Lj.

We assume

5

Labor is assumed to be growing at the same, constant rate, n , ' in both countries,
that is

Lj( t ) = Lj( O) ent , J. = H, F .
The scale of the two economies is identical, so that LH(O)

(1)

= LF(O) .a

There can be many alternative assumptions on the way investment processes take
place in a two-sector model of trade with capital accumulation.

In most studies the

dynamic aspects of the Heckscher-Ohlin model have been analyzed with Meade-Uzawa
type two-sector growth model, 4 in which two goods are assumed to be a consumption good
and a capital good. Instead, we assume that households consume both types of goods and
that capital accumulation requires both goods as input. In order to make a global analysis
of the capital accumulation tractable, we will assume later that the relative composition of
inputs in the investment process is identical to the relative composition of goods in con
sumption given a relative price.
Each country can accumulate the physical capital, Kj, which can be used in either
sector, using linear homogeneous capital accumulation function satisfying concavity, differ
entiability and the Inada conditions:

(2)

where we assume

more general case with different relative scale between the populations of the two
countries and with different, constant, rates of population growth could be handled without
much difficulty.
4See Fischer and Frenkel (1974), Kemp (1969), Meade (1961), Oniki and Uzawa (1961),
Stiglitz (1970), and Uzawa (1965).
3A
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h' (0) = +CD , and h' (+CD)

=0 .

I¾(t) and 1{(t) are respectively quantities of good X and Y used for investment in
country j . For cost minimizing of investors, the input ratio I¾(t)/I{(t) is uniquely
determined by the relative price of X and Y.
I¾(t)

= ~(p(t)),

(3)

I{(t)
where p(t) is the price of goods Y in terms of goods X . The investment ratio function

cp( ) satisfies
cp'(·) > 0, cp(O)

= 0,

and cp(+CD) =+CD.

The optimization of investors also requires

(4)
where q(t) is the price of a claim to one unit of physical capital in terms of goods X .
Unless this condition is not satisfied, the optimal investment will become plus or minus
infinite.
Labor and physical capital are immobile between the countries, while they are com
pletely mobile within each country. Not only the two goods, X and Y, but also the
ownership claim to the physical capital are traded internationally, so that the current
account balance of each country need not always be zero. Due to the linear homogeneity of
the capital formation function, the assumption of free trade of the two goods implies that
free international transaction of the ownership claim to physical capital is equivalent to
perfect international mobility of physical capital. As is well known, the trade of goods and

7

the factor mobility are complete substitutes, s if both countries are imperfectly specialized.
In such a situation, the trade pattern and the international capital flows will be indeterm
inate. Thus, in order to analyze the interaction between the international trade and the
capital flows, we need additional assumptions regarding the question which of the trades
occur first, trade of two goods, or trade of the claims to capital with one good. 6
In the real world, both transactions encounter many obstacles. Tariffs and sectoral
adjustment cost reduce the volume of goods traded. Official restrictions on international
capital flows and difficulty in getting information about production and management in
foreign countries reduce the volume of international capital flows. In this paper we will
analyze the case in which capital flows occur only when there is perfect specialization. We
assume not only that no obstacles exist in the trade of goods, but also that costs in inter
national capital flows are so slight that we can disregard them as if the factor price
equalization were to hold even after perfect specialization occurs. In a way, our model
reflects the traditional attitude of international trade economists who emphasize the
analysis of trade flows compared to that of factor movements. Whether or not our assump
tion can be justified is naturally an empirical question. A promising alternative way of
resolving this indeterminacy is proposed by Koch (1989), in which he analyzes a similar
model (but with constant saving ratios) by assuming some portfolio preference between
home and foreign investment.
In order to analyze the global rather than local properties of the dynamical system,
we shall make the following Kaldorian saving assumptions. In fact, Stiglitz was assuming a
constant propensity to save for profit incomes when he analyzed the transition path to the
steady-state equilibrium.

ssee Chipman (1971), Mundell (1957), Ohlin (1933), Samuelson (1949), and Wong (1986).
6Qniki and Uzawa (1965) and Stiglitz (1970) assume that there is trade in both consump
tion and investment goods, but not in securities. Fischer and Frenkel (1974) assume that
there is trade in consumption goods and securities, but not in investment goods.
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ASSUMPTION (i) All the wages are consumed. Only the rentiers save in such a way to
maximize the utility to be derived from their consumption.
(ii) The population of rentiers is growing at the same rate as that of labor.

(iii) The instantaneous utility function of both labor and rentiers satisfies
U(cxj ., cyj .) = ln(H(cxj ., cyj .)) for j = H, F and i = 1, 2,
,1

,1

,1

,1

where subscript 1 indicates the labor and subscript 2 does the rentier so that c¾ 1 and
'
c~ 1 are the labor's per-capita consumption of goods X and goods Y in the j'th

'

country, c¾ 2 and c~ 2 , the rentier's per-capita consumption of goods X and goods
'
'
Y . The function H( •) is identical with the capital accumulation function defined above.
Under Assumptions (i) to (iii), the maximization problems that the labor in the
j'th country face is:

subject to
c¾ 1(t)

'

+ p(t)c~ 1(t) = w(t) ,
'

where w(t) is the wage rate in terms of goods X. The maximization problems that the
rentiers in the j'th country face is:

9

subject to

a)(t) = q(t){r(t)aj(t) - c¾,2(t) - p(t)c{,2(t)}- n• aj(t),
aj(o)

(5)

=a),

(6)

aj(t) ~ O,

(7)

c¾it)~o,

(8)

'

(9)
where aJ(t) is per-capita physical capital owned by the rentiers in country j .

~

is the

time preference rate of the rentiers in country j. r(t) is the rental to the capital in terms
of goods X. The time-preference rate pJ can be different between the two countries.
Utility maximization of both labor and rentirrs requires that the marginal rate of
.
.
substitution of cXJ .(t) and cyJ .(t) equal to the relative price p(t) . Because of the
,1

,1

homotheticity and quasi-concavity of U(), the optimal c¾)t)/c{)t) is an increasing
function of p(t) .
Under Assumption (iii), this function is identical with the investment ratio function

cp' ( ) > 0 , for j

= H, F

and i

= 1, 2 ,

(10)

that is, at any relative price p(t) the consumption ratio of the two goods is identical with
the input ratio of the two goods in investment.

Admittedly, Assumption (iii) is quite strong. However, the alternative assumption
taken by the Meade-Uzawa model is also a stringent one.7 Besides, the two-country
version of their model assumed some simple saving behavior usually with constant saving
ratio, when the microeconomic foundation was also given, that was restricted to the sta
tionary states. s In contrast to the Meade-Uzawa model, we can study the consequence of
the intertemporal optimization behavior partly due to the fact that short-run equilibria
are independent of consumers' intertemporal optimization under our assumptions.
Using the function

<p( •), the labor's optimal consumption levels c¾ 1(t) and

'

c{ 1(t) can be written as

'

.
c¾, 2 (t)

1

= 9?(p(t)) +

p(t) w(t).

Under Assumption (iii), the foregoing rentier's maximization problem can be trans
formed into

subject to

a)(t)

= {~f!J - n}aj(t) -

aj(o)

=a),

c~(t),

(11)
(6)

aJ(t) ~ 0 ,

(7)

~0.

(12)

c~(t)

our notation, they assume Ii(t) = 0 and c{,i(t) = 0 regardless of the level of
relative price.
8Stiglitz (1970) studies the consumers' intertemporal optimization behavior. But only the
property of long-run stationary equilibria is analyzed in a two-country case.
7In
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Here c~(t) is the rentier's per-capita spending in terms of real capital unit. By equation

(4) and the definition of cp( ) , c~(t) can be written,

(13)
The optimal savings behavior is given by budget constraint (11), initial condition (6), and
proportional consumption behavior

{14)
The rentier's optimal consumption levels of the goods, c¾ 2 ( t) , c{ 2 ( t) , can be written
'
'
as

III. THE DETERMINATION OF THE SHORT-RUN EQUILIBRIUM
We shall first describe briefly the determination of the equilibrium at each moment
of time, given two countries' physical capital ownership, AH(t) and AF (t) . For brevity,
we denote all variables without explicitly referring to time t in this section.
From the factor price equalization mechanism and capital movements under perfect
specialization, the rentals to capital, r , in two countries are equalized at any time. under
imperfect specialization, we have

(15)
(16)

12
If perfect specialization takes place, then the variables corresponding to the disappeared

sector will become meaningless. For example, if the foreign country perfectly specializes in
goods Y production, (15) and (16) will become as follows:
(15')
(16')
Because of the factor-price equalization mechanism and capital movements under
perfect specialization, the equilibrium price-factor-reward structure and the equalized
capital-labor ratios, kx and ky , are not affected by the distribution of the world
endowments among the countries. They are determined in the same way as in the closed
economy that is endowed capital K and labor L as much as
K = KH

+ KF = AH + AF and

L

= LH + LF

respectively (cf. Jones, 1965; Uzawa, 1961). AH (KH) and AF (KF) are the amount of
physical capital owned by (located in) the home and the foreign country.
From profit-maximization conditions, we obtain
(17)

(18)
where w is the wage rate, w the wage-rentals ratio. Given a price of goods Y in terms
of goods X p, the wage-rentals ratio w as well as the capital-labor ratio in each sector
kx, ky is uniquely determined from equations (17) and (18).9 As p rises, the price of
the factor service that is intensively used in the goods Y sector becomes more expensive
9The short-run equilibrium of our model is identical with the equilibrium of the two
sector model of Jones (1965). For detail of comparative statistics, see Jones (1965).
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compared with other factor prices. Under our assumption that the goods Y sector is more
labor intensive, w rises:

w'(p) > 0.
As w rises, capital is substituted for labor in each production sector:
kx(P) > 0 , ky(P) > 0.

In Figure 1, the vertical axis indicates the price of goods Y in terms of goods X .
The horizontal axis indicates the share of the world labor that is allocated to the Y sector,

ly

=(L~ + L~)/(LH + LF) .
The SS curve denotes the locus of

ly- p

pairs that satisfies equilibrium condi

tions of factor markets:

(19)
where

k

is the world capital-labor ratio, i.e.,

= (kH + kF)/2.

Given a world capital-labor ratio, k , if the price of labor intensive

goods Y in terms of goods X rises, then kx and ky will increase and the labor share
of the labor intensive sector, ly, will need to expand to keep the factor markets in equi
librium (see the upward-sloping SS curve in Figure 1). The world economy specializes in
X (ly = 0) for a sufficient low p, and in Y

(ly = 1) for a sufficiently high p. If the

world capital labor ratio, k , increases, the SS curve shifts upward.
The DD curve denotes the locus of ly- p pairs that satisfies equilibrium condi
tions of goods markets. Equilibrium of goods markets requires
(20)

From (17), (18), and (20), we get the demand-side relationship of ly and p :
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(21)
The DD curve shows this relationship. The slope of the DD curve may be either positive
or negative. As p rises, the demand shifts from goods Y to goods X . If the labor was a
unique production factor, then ly would decrease as p rises. Because the capital also
moves between sectors, the response of ly to p is indefinite. Nevertheless the reciprocal
of the slope of the DD curve is always smaller than that of the
0

SS

curve. 10 And

< ly < 1 for all p . Therefore there exists for any given k , a unique intersection of

the two curves which determines the short-run equilibrium. If the world capital-labor
ratio, k , increases as time elapses, the SS curve shifts upward, raising p . As p rises
kx and ky all increase. Due to the assumption that the consumption ratios of the two

10 The

reciprocal of the slope of the SS curve is

The reciprocal of the slope of the DD curve is

where
kx

w

+ kX < 1 '

and

Therefore,

dly

dly

cip SS >clp DD
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goods are identical with the input ratio of the two goods in investment, the short-run equi
librium is independent of the dynamics of the model. If the consumption ratio of the two
goods was different from the input ratio in investment, then the DD curve in Figure 1
would depend on households' decision on intertemporal consumption pattern.
Let us now turn to the specialization pattern of each country and the state of inter
national lending in short-run equilibria. In the short-run, not only the world capital-labor
ratio, k, but also the levels of per-capita physical capital owned by the two, aH and
aF, are given, and they satisfy
(22)
If aH and aF lie between the equilibrium capital-labor ratios of X and Y sector kx

and ky , i.e., ky < aj < kx , j

= H, F ,

then neither perfect specialization nor inter

national capital fl.ow will occur in the world under our assumption of the relative ease of
trade compared to capital movements. If aH or aF lies outside of kx and ky, then
international capital flows will take place.
We can analyze by Figure 211 the specialization pattern in more detail. The hori
zontal axis indicates the distribution of the labor force between the two countries
(LH, LF) .

The vertical axis denotes the distribution of the ownership claim to the

physical capital (AH, AF) . In a short-run equilibrium, the wage-rental ratio, p and w
are determined as in Figure 1. The line XOH in Figure 2 denotes the locus of cost
minimizing capital-labor pairs at the goods X sector in the home country under the
equilibrium wage-rental ratio w , that is, the locus of tangency between isoquant curves
of the goods X sector and iso-cost lines, the slope of which is w . Similarly the line
YOH for the goods Y sector in the home country, and the line X*OH and Y*OH for
the foreign country, X*OH and Y*OH are the symmetrical images of XOH and YOH

11This figure is frequently used in international trade theory (cf. Dixit and Norman 1980;
Helpman and Krugman 1985; and Travis 1964).
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respectively rotated symmetric to the center of the figure. Due to the homotheticity of the
production functions, these lines are straight.
In general, if the distribution of the labor force and the capital ownership is located
in the parallelogram

OHFOFE ,

like point

G,

then neither specialization nor

international capital fl.ow will occur, and factor prices of the two countries will be equalized
by trade alone. The location of the world capital, (KH, KF) will be identical with the
ownership pattern (AH, AF) . The production and the trade pattern of two countries is
also determined by Figure 2. The labor allocation between two sectors in each country is
determined by

Consistent with the standard theory, a capital abundant country relatively specializes in
capital intensive goods and exports them. In fact, because of our assumption of the iden
tical size of the population, we need to consider points like G , the points on TT' , the
dividing segment of the box into halves.
Suppose the capital ownership pair (AH, AF) is located as point G

1

•

Then the

capital rentals of the foreign country will tend to be higher than those of the home country
even under free trade. The minimum amount of capital flows that equalizes two countries'
factor prices is expressed as the vertical distance between point G

1

and the parallelogram,

i.e., G'Q. As capital inflows this amount into the foreign country, the location of the
world capital, (KH, KF) , is determined as point Q , on which the production and the
trade pattern in the two countries depend. The foreign country perfectly specializes in the
production of goods Y. The home country produces both goods.

17
The relative size of kx to ky determines which country perfectly specializes
under the unbalanced capital ownership pattern. If kx is smaller than that in Figure 2
( XOH is flatter) and point R is located below point Q , then the home country will
perfectly specialize with asset endowment pattern G' . In Figure 2,
1
TQ - k - 2 ky
Tit- 1
2 kx

From this equation and k

= (1- ly)kx + lyky,

it is clear that TQ/TR is less than

unity if and only if ly > 1/2 . Thus we obtain the following
PROPOSITION I.

Assume the ownership pattern is so unbalanced that perfect specialization

and international capital flows take place.

Perfect specialization will occur in a labor

abundant country (in a capital abundant country), if and only if the fraction of the world
labor allocated to the labor intensive industry ly , is greater than 0:5 ( smaller than 0.5).
Und;-r our assumption that two countries have same amount of labor force, if one country
perfectly specializes in goods Y production (in goods X production), ly will certainly
be greater than 0.5 (smaller than 0.5).
Note that if the ownership pattern is unbalanced enough, that is AH/(AH+ AF)
is close to 0 or 1, then perfect specialization will certainly occur, because ky is positive in
any short-run equilibrium. In a short-run equilibrium, ly is determined as Figure 1
displays. If the equilibrium point, E, is located on the right of the ly
perfect specialization will occur in a labor abundant country.

= 1/2

line,
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IV. CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND DYNAMICS
OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING
Let us now analyze capital accumulation process in the growing world economy.
The rate of returns to real capital in terms of composite capital goods can be written
by equation (4),
(22)
At any instant of time the world average capital stock k(t)

= (aH(t) + aF(t))/2

is given

so that from short-run equilibrium conditions (equations (17), (18), (19), (21)) w, p and
kx

will be determined.

(aH(t)

Accordingly

r(t)/q(t)

is the function of

k(t)

or

+ aF(t))/2.
Let us define this function by µ( •) such that
!ill_
qfij = µ [1,(aH(t)

+ aH (t))] .

(23)

It is easily seen

< 0 .12
Also we have

1im µ(k)
k~+ro

12This

kx

=0

inequality follows fx.'

> ky and dw/dk > O •

and lim µ(k)
k~o

= +ro

< O , h' > O , dkx/dw > O , fx. > O , h'' < O ,

cp'

>0,
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by Inada conditions on the production functions.13
Hence the dynamical equations of per-capita net assets can be expressed as
aH(t)

= {µ((aH(t)

+ aF(t))/2) - n -,all}aH(t)

{24)

aF(t)

= {µ((aH(t)

+ aF(t))/2) -n -l}aF(t)

{25)

Therefore we can analyze the long-run path of capital accumulation exactly in the same
way as we did in a single commodity model {Fukao and Hamada 1989). Owing to the
assumption that the consumption ratio of the two goods is identical with the input ratio of
the two goods in investment at any relative price, we can analyze the dynamics in terms of
single composite good, i.e., the real capital. Figure 3 illustrates this. If the home country
is more time patient, i.e. ,all < /
and

B.

µ(aH(t)/2)
namely /

Only

E

= n +,all.
= / =/3,

is stable.

, then there will be three long-run equilibria O , E
At point

E

aF

=0

and

aH

is determined by

If the rate of time preference is identical between the countries,

then the long-run equilibria are all the points on line CD , which

is defined by the pair (a H, aF ·1 satisfying

What is the relationship between the trade specialization pattern and capital move
ments? Figure 4 illustrates this. The horizontal axis indicates the amount of per-capita
capital owned by the home country, aH , and the amount of capital located in the home
country, kH ; similarly the vertical axis aF and kF. Given the pair of initial capital
ownership

(aH, aF) , world capital-labor ratio k is given so that by the short-run

equilibrium conditions p and w. Given the pair of initial capital stock, both (aH + aF)
and {kH + kF) are given so that (aH, aF) , {kH, kF) are on the negative 45 degree line
13 Since h' ' ( ) < 0 , h' ( ) declines when k approaches infinity. k -+ +ro implies
kx-+ +ro , which in turn implies f_i{kx)-+ 0 . This proves the first property. The second
property also comes from the fact that k-+ 0 implies kx-+ 0 , and accordingly
f_i{kx) -+ +ro .
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T*T *. If (aH, aF) is inside the intersection set of the diversification cones that will be
1

shortly defined, the allocation pair

(kH, kF)

and the ownership pair

(aH, aF)

will

coincide each other. If the pair is outside the intersection set then one country will be
perfectly specialized and capital movements will take place. In Figure 4, the critical points
where perfect specialization starts are indicated by P*

and

Q* , the border of the

negative 45 degree line T*T * with the intersection set of diversification cones HXOHY
1

and FXOFY.
The location of HXOH y
(aH, aF) and accordingly k

and FXOFY will be determined as follows. Suppose

= (aH + aF)/2

mined so that the angles of OHX

I

OHy,

are given. Then, p and w will be deter
OFX,

OFy

will also be given by the

mechanism that was illustrated by Figure 2. Those rays determine the critical levels of
diversification for aH and aF such as Q* and P* . Q in Figure 2, where the foreign
country starts specializing in the production of Y, corresponds to point Q* in Figure 4.
Similarly, R, P , and S in Figure 2 correspond to R* , P* , and S* in Figure 4. P*
indicates the point where the home countr1 begins to perfectly specialize in Y . In other
words, given k, the pair (aH, aF) is on T*T *, and the value of aH, aF calculated
1

by the value of AH and AS at the critical points of complete specialization in Figure 2
and labor force will determine the location of R* , Q* , P* , and S* . By moving the
value of k, we obtain the loci of OHX, OHy, OFX, and OFy. It can be easily
seen that

OHX and OF y

are the mirror images of OFX and OHy

respectively

reflected by the 45 degree line.
If the two countries' ownership pair (aH, aF) is located like point G* within the

intersection of two cones, HXOH y and FXOF y, then no specialization will take place.
Factor prices of the two countries will be equalized by trade alone and no international
capital flow will need to occur. Therefore the location of the world capital, (kH, kF) is
identical to the ownership pattern (aH, aF) . The production and trade pattern of two
countries is also determined by Figure 4. The labor allocation between two sectors in each
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country is determined by

and

Consistent with the standard theory, the capital abundant country relatively specializes in
and exports more capital-intensive goods.
Suppose the capital ownership pair (aH, aF) is located like point N . Then the
foreign country will perfectly specialize in the labor-intensive goods Y, and the capital
rentals of the foreign country will tend to be higher than those of the home country under
the free trade without capital movements. The minimum amount of capital movements
that equalizes two countries' factor prices, is expressed as the vertical distance of point Q*
and point N , that is, kF - aF . Thus in the presence of capital movements, the pair of
location of capital (kF, kF) will be at point Q* , and will determine the production and
trade patterns. The foreign country perfectly specializes in and exports goods Y, and the
home country produces both goods. The labor allocatkn between two sectors in the home
country is given by

Notice that the amount of international capital movements is reduced by trade compared
with that in a single-good economy, where the location of the world capital would be
determined by point I and the amount of international capital movements equals the
vertical distance between point I and point N .
Now let us leave the static analysis of constant (aH, aF) and k, and consider the
dynamics of capital accumulation and trade specialization. As explained above, the asset
accumulation path in this model is determined exactly by the same dynamical system (24)
and (25) as in the single-goods growth model (cf. Fukao and Hamada 1989). Thus the
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phase-diagram analysis in Figures 3(a) and 3(b) is valid as well. One can visualize the
accumulation process and specialization pattern by superimposing phase diagram, Figure 3,
on the diversification cones in Figure 4.

Figure 5 is the superimposition of 3(a) on

Figure 4.
Suppose the initial ownership pair is inside the intersection of the diversification
cones like C . Then capital ownership pattern moves towards E according to the phase
diagram 3(a). Both the ownership pair (aH, aF) and the allocation pair (kH, kF) start
from C , following the phase diagram as drawn in Figure 3(a). When they hit the border
of the intersection set, in this case OFy , at D , (aH, aF) will still follow the path
depicted in the phase diagram, but (kH, kF) will depart from the path and proceed along
DM . The foreign country will be specialized in labor-intensive goods. A similar story
applies to the world economy where both (aH, aF) and (kH, kF) start from a point V .
First, both pairs move towards south-west direction. Either they cross aH

=0

line and

diverge from one another when they hit segment DM ; or as indicated in Figure 5, they
keep moving towards southwest, hit OFy at W where (kH, kF) starts moving towards
M on OFY while (aH, aF) still keeps moving towards E.
If the initial ownership pair is like point U, then, under our assumption of positive

but infinitesimal cost of capital movements, the capital allocation will be instantaneously
adjusted at the moment when capital moments are liberalized, and (aH, aF) will move
along UE , and (kH, kF) along JM .

It is clear from the construction that, except for the measure-zero case where two
cones

HXOHY,

FXOFy

exactly coincides each other, only one country completely

specializes in production of one good, and the other keeps producing both goods. If we
define state E as the Ramsey equilibrium with the home country as the empire, we can
summarize our analysis as
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Under the assumptions of the model, if the rate of time preference of the

PROPOSITION II.

home country is even slightly less than that of the foreign country, then the capital ownership
. ( aH , aF)
pair

will approach the Ramsey state with the home country as the empire.

Almost surely, either of the following two cases will take place after a while: ( i) the foreign
country will perfectly specialize in labor-intensive goods, or ( ii) the home country will
perfectly specialize in capital-intensive goods.
This result that the complete specialization of both countries is a measure-zero
phenomenon is a distinct departure from the result in Stiglitz (1970) where such a case is
generally possible.

The channel of factor-price equalization through factor movements

presumably mitigates the need for perfect specialization in both sides.
The reader is now curious which alternatives (i) or (ii) will take place in the devel
opment path. Which of (i) or (ii) occur depends on whether OF y is inside OHX (i.e.
close to the 45 degree line) or OHX is inside OFy. This question can be answered,
given k and accordingly w, by drawing Figure 2 and by asking whether R is above Q
(or S is below P ). Without specifying utility function on commodities, the answer to
this question is not so obvious.14
From Proposition I, under a given value of k, the specialization pattern depends
on the value of ly. In other words, labor-abundant country (the foreign country in this
case) specializes if ly > 1/2 . From equation (21), one obtains

1++

.clE)_
ly = { p I

}-l

ky(P)/w
kx(P)/ w + 1

'

(26)

where cp(p)/p is the relative share of expenditures on x to that on Y , and kx/ w and
ky/ w are respectively the relative share of capital income to labor income in X and Y
14From the relationships such as ky < kx , ky 5 k 5 kx , 1im kx = O , 1im ky = O ,
k~o
k~w
it is easy to see that OHX and OFy start from the origin and stay below the positive
45 degree line.
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sector. Therefore ly depends on the elasticity of substitution in expenditures in consump
tion and investment

and the elasticities of substitution in production

Assume that, for simplicity, 'T/x
Douglas.

= 'T/y = 1 ,

i.e., production functions are Cobb

We can discuss the determinants of specialization pattern depending on the

elasticity of substitution in expenditures 'f/E .
(i) 'f/E

=1.

Then all the relative shares in (26) becomes constant, and

OHY, OFX, OFy become all straight lines. If we denote the capital share in X and
Y by o:X and o:y respectively, and the share of expenditure on X by , , then one can
easily see:
(a) If (1 - o:x)/(1 - o:y) < (1-,)/,, labor-abundant country will specialize
in labor-intensive sector when the perfect specialization takes place.
(b) If

(1 - o:x)/(1 - o:y) > (1-,)/,,

then capital-abundant country will

specialize.
(c) If

(1- o:x)/(1 - o:y)

= (1-,)/,,

then both countries specialize at the

same time.
(ii) 'f/E < 1 . Then the specialization of capital-abundant country will occur when_
k is small, and the specialization of labor-abundant country will occur when k is large.
This can be seen from the fact that

'TJE

=1,

DD

becomes upward sloping and

line in Figure 1, which was vertical when

ly

increases when

k

diversification cones are no more linear cones as are shown in Figure 6(a).

increases.

The
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(iii) 1/E > 1 . Then the specialization of labor-abundant country will occur when
k is small, and the specialization of capital-abundant country will occur when k is large.
See Figure 6(b ).
Even in this rather simple case with unitary elasticity of substitution in production,
if we have non-unitary elasticity of substitution in expenditures, the dynamics of trade and

capital flows will take various patterns. Suppose, for example, 1/E > 1 ,

r/1- < {?

and the

initial configuration (aH, aF) starts from Region II [with k < k* where k* is defined by

µ(k*)

= r/1- + n ]

in 6(b ). Then, first the foreign country will specialize in labor-intensive

goods Y , and next the home country will specialize in capital-intensive goods X as the
path moves into Region I. Also, if 1/E > 1 ,

r/1- = /

and the initial (aH, aF) is in

Region II. Then the following path will be possible. First the foreign country specializes in
Y

with international borrowing, next both countries incompletely specialize without

international borrowing, and finally the home country specializes in X with international
lending.
Let us return to the case of (i) where 1/E

=1.

Since ax> ay by our assump

tion, for a value of 'Y that is sufficiently close to 0.5, Case (i) holds. Thus one can state
PROPOSITION III.

Suppose both elasticities of substitution in productions and that in

expenditures are unity.
I

= (1, 1)

Then there exists an open interval on the expenditure share 'Y ,

such that 1/2 E I and that for any 'Y inside I the foreign country will be

specialized in producing labor intensive goods Y .
This proposition indicates that if the expenditure pattern towards both goods is
more or less balanced, then the borrowing country will specialize in labor-intensive goods.
When the Ramsey state E is attained, the more patient country owns the world as an
empire, and the less patient country will be left as a colony with monolithic production of
solely labor-intensive goods.

(We have to notice that this result depends on the
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assumption of equal sizes of the two countries.

If there is a difference in scales of

population, the smaller country will be more likely to specialize.)
If we relax the assumption of unitary elasticity of substitution in production, then

the story will be even more involved. We do not attempt to analyze this case here because
non-unitary production elasticity would easily lead to the factor-intensity reversal that we
excluded from our model at the outset of this paper.
Now we are ready to compare the amount of international lending or borrowing in
this model with trade to that in a single good model without trade. It will suffice to com
pare the relative magnitude of international credit at the Ramsey equilibria at E . In a
single good model where one abstracts from trade, the amount of per-capita international
credit equals the distance between A and E in Figure 5. In the model with factor-price
equalization through trade, the per-capita credit equals the horizontal distance between M
and E . In particular, in this Cobb-Douglas example with (1 - ax)/(1 - ay) < (1-'Y)/'y
ky

ME

n=r=
-

'Y(l
ay
1 - ay

1 'Y 1 -

ax
ay

ax
'Y -ay

+

+

ax)
"fax

+
+

(1-"()( 1 - ay)
(1-"()ay

(1-"()

< 1.

(27)

( 1-"()

This ratio varies with the difference in capital share between the two sectors and it is not
much less the unity for reasonable values of ax and ay . 15 For example, if ax

ay = 1/4 ,

'Y = 1/2

then

ME/ZE = 17/21 .

Only for the extreme case where

ax= 2/5, ay = 1/5, 'Y = 1/2 ME/ZE = 7/12.

15If

(1- ax)/(1 - ay) > (1-'Y)/'Y, the ratio will become again
'Y

+ (1-'YH ay - ax) I [ ax ( 1
'Y + (1-"f )ay/ ax

= 1/3 ,

- ax)l

<1.
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This is, at least, a partial answer to the criticism on predictions made by a
single-commodity model (Hamada and Iwata 1989).

A single-commodity model may

exaggerate the amount of indebtedness. The degree of exaggeration depends on the broad
ness of divergence cones, and may not be too great if ax is close to ay. At the same
time, one should note that this model makes the conceivably most unfavorable assumption
against capital movements by maximizing the factor-price equalization role of trade in
goods. If we resolve the indeterminacy issue by assuming that international trade of final
goods X and Y is slightly more costly than movements of real capital and ownership
claim to capital, then capital-labor ratios of two countries will always be identical, i.e.,
kH

= kF ,

and the amount of indebtedness will be identical with that in a single

commodity model. At any rate, qualitative conclusions obtained for the long-run capital
ownership pattern hold intact even in a model with trade.
We summarize as
PROPOSITION IV.

A single-good model exaggerates the amount of international

indebtedness in the long run.

The degree of overestimate increases with the divergence

between ax and ay .

V. POSSIBLE GENERALIZATIONS
We will briefly discuss the possible consequences of relaxing some of our assump
tions and some further extensions.
First, one may wish to relax the assumption that only rentiers save and that
workers do not. Then one has to take account of the development of not only physical but
also human capital. The system becomes intractable by analytical solutions. We have
tried some simulations that seem to indicate that most of qualitative results are similar to
the case with our Kaldorian saving assumptions. For example if

r/1- = rl,

aH(t)/aF(t)

will be kept constant and the final equilibrium will be reached such that r/q =

r/1- = rl
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and k

= (aH + aF)/2 .

If the rates of time preference are different, the less patient coun

try may end up with the situation where not only its physical capital is totally owned by
the other country but also the future earnings from its human capital become collateral to
its further indebtedness. In general, neoclassical foundations for possible different attitudes
to profit and wage income seem to be an interesting question.
Secondly, if we allow a general functional form rather than the logarithmic form in
the instantaneous utility, then cJ(t) will depend not only on the present physical asset
aj(t) but also on the whole future stream of rate of returns to capital. 16 This will make
the analysis quite difficult.
Thirdly, one can superimpose more general nonlinear saving behavior into this trade
model. We have considered in another paper (Fukao and Hamada 1989) the consequence of
non-linear saving behavior such that

r/1-

or

r/'

depend non-monotonically on the value

of wealth aH or aF reflecting the fact that people will not wish to save much if they are
very poor.

Thus we could analyze three types of equilibria, co-property equilibria C

where both economies grow harmoniously without substantial international credit,
imperialism equilibria (the Ramsey states) E and F , and starvation equilibria O . This
dynamical system can be superimposed on the diversification cones as shown in Figure

1.11

Similar stories can be told on the development of specialization patterns.

16 This

can be seen from the fact that in such a case, the optimum condition becomes
instead of ( 14)
(14')
where '1/J( •) denotes the felicity function.
17 To avoid excessive complexity, here we assume the unitary elasticity of substitution
between expenditures on the two goods so that all the diversification cones become linear
cones, i.e., OHX , OHy, etc. are all straight lines.
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
By integrating the model of trade with capital movements, we have extended a two
country model with different saving behavior between the nations to a more realistic
situation where capital movements can take place. We have resolved the indeterminacy
problem intrinsic in the model that allow the coexistence of trade and factor movements by
assuming that the flow of capital is infinitesimally more costly than the flow of goods but
that transactions costs can be neglected in the calculation of equilibrium paths. Thus we
have integrated the tradition of trade theory without factor movements and factor move
ments theory without trade. By additional assumptions, on instantaneous utility functions
of rentiers and the composite bundle of goods for investment, we have obtained a model
where the behavior of asset accumulation can be dichotomized from the pattern of trade
specialization. Moreover, all the behavior in our model, with some exceptions in Section V,
has a complete microeconomic foundation.
We have shown that complete specialization will take place in one country, and
most likely in the country with a higher rate of time preference into the more labor
intensive sector, but that almost surely only one of the two countries will completely
specialize. We have also shown that a single-country model does exaggerate the amount of
capital movements and that the degree of exaggeration depends on the difference of factor
shares between the two sectors. However, we have also found that the qualitative nature of
asset accumulation patterns obtained in a single-commodity model holds intact in the
model that incorporates trade.
In this sense, we have made both trade theory and factor movements theory more
realistic. Needless to say, there is still a wide gap between reality and such a level of
economic analysis as has been conducted in this paper. The distance between actual trade
practices and the standard trade theory could be compared to the distance between actual
gardens and artificial miniature gardens.

As Leamer (1984) clearly demonstrates, the
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Heckscher-Ohlin trade paradigm can only explain very little part of trading patterns in the
world economy. Further empirical investigations are needed to make our theory applicable
to the real world.
Another interesting application of this model may be found in the controversy
around the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) article on the degree of capital movements (cf.
Dooley et al. 1987). Their claim that international capital mobility is imperfect because
increased savings do not create capital outflows is under scrutiny from the standpoint of
intertemporal optimization, nature of shocks and econometric methodology (e.g., Obstfeld
1986; Roubini 1989). This paper offers another explanation as to why investment responds
to increasing savings. If the economy is perfectly specialized, then increased savings will
create immediate capital outflows. If the economy is imperfectly specialized, however,
increased savings will be absorbed in capital deepening to change the industrial composi
tion between the sectors. This theory would predict little response of capital outflows to
increased savings for a while. Then after the complete specialization takes place, capital
flows will respond w increased savings one by one. Whether or not this explanation is
applicable should be carefully analyzed by empirical studies. The recent burst of capital
outflows from West Germany and Japan to the United States, however, seems to suggest
that this may be one of the plausible explanations.
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Dynamics of Trade Pattern and International Lending;
The Time Preference Rate of the Home Country Is Smaller Than That
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FIGURE 6

(a) Specialization Pattern, 77E
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FIGURE 7
Dynamics of Trade Pattern and International Lending
under the Fisherian Time Preference
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